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The Importance of Integrated Goal Setting:
The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts
to Private Firms
A. Frank Adams, III, George E. Manners, Jr., Joseph H. Astrachan, Pietro Mazzola

In this article, we examine ﬁnancial return, answer the question of how one knows when
the return is adequate, and explore the relationship of short- and long-term returns as
they relate to business health.

Introduction
Does proﬁt mean that a business is achieving an
adequate return? This seemingly simple question
has a deﬁnite answer, but not an easy one. In this
article, we examine ﬁnancial return, answer the
question of how one knows when the return is
adequate, and explore the relationship of shortand long-term returns as they relate to business
health. Obviously, the simplest answer to the
above question is that a business achieves adequate ﬁnancial returns when it meets or exceeds
the owners’ goals.1 But what goals are important,
1
For publicly traded ﬁrms, maximizing shareholder returns is
viewed as the primary goal. In that context, Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that the alignment of owner and
manager interests is necessary to reduce agency costs. Several
authors, including Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), contend that corporate governance is
enhanced, and therefore agency costs are reduced, when corporate ownership is concentrated. Morck and Yeung reach a
different conclusion when considering the agency costs in the
context of ﬁrms controlled by family business groups. They
note that “such structures could conceivably give rise to agency
problems at least as serious as those known to afﬂict widely
held ﬁrms” (2003, p. 379).

how are they set, and how do they affect one
another?2
2
A family and its business are interdependent and the decisions affecting one quite clearly affect the other. The head of a
family, in Becker’s (1974) article, “maximizes a utility function
that depends on the consumption of all family members
subject to a budget constraint determined by family income
and family consumption . . . In this sense, then, a family with
a ‘head’ can be said to maximize ‘its’ consistent and transitive
utility function of the consumption of different members
subject to a budget constraint deﬁned on family variables”
(1974, pp. 1078–1079). This analysis can be extended to a family
business by applying Becker’s concept of “social income,”
which is “the sum of a person’s own income (his earnings, etc.)
and the monetary value to him of the relevant characteristics
of others” (1974, p. 1063). Habbershon, Williams, and
MacMillan (2003) extend this line of reasoning by constructing “a uniﬁed systems model of family ﬁrm performance [that]
focuses not only on describing stakeholder constituencies and
conditions, but also shows how the parts of the system interact to generate idiosyncratic antecedents to ﬁrm performance.
[They] begin with a general performance proposition in which
the outcome of interest is maximization of the utility function
of the family business social system” (2003, p. 454). They
propose that various “arguments that may be included in the
metasystem utility function [are]: the income levels of shareholders . . . short-run proﬁt, long-run proﬁt, . . . dividend
levels, the quickest sale of the business, and/or long-run wealth
accumulation, etc.” (2003, pp. 455–456). Chrisman, Chua, and
Litz (2003) suggest that Habbershon et al.’s (2003) “approach
can be made more widely applicable, without any loss in the
force of their arguments, by simply recognizing and allowing
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In brief, we show in this article that a business
is achieving an adequate ﬁnancial return if it is
meeting or exceeding its weighted average cost of
capital, and a business is balancing its short- and
long-term returns if it is keeping money in the
business in a manner that allows for planned
growth while achieving the weighted average cost
of capital.3 We maintain that owners’ ﬁnancial
goals are most simply expressed as goals for business growth and goals for business payout.
There are two parts to the cost of capital: the
cost of debt and the cost of equity. We begin this
article with an exploration of what is arguably the
more difﬁcult of the two to deﬁne, especially in a
privately owned company: the cost of equity. In a
private company, one can argue that the cost of
equity is quite arbitrary and can take on any value,
from one determined using a public company
model, to the “gut feel” family members have with
regard to the returns they desire from their investment.4 In their exploration of the “family effect,” de
Visscher, Aronoff, and Ward (1995), for example,

argue that if family owners are very happy then
their expected return drops to nothing.5
It is clear that the cost of equity has always presented businesspeople with a problem when
moving from theory to practice. Even for large,
ﬁnancially sophisticated, publicly traded ﬁrms,
the cost of equity can have many interpretations.6
We can imagine the chuckle—or perhaps the
anger—coming from John Chambers of Cisco
Systems when in 1999 his ﬁnance staff gave him a
high value for the cost of equity and he was sitting
on a P/E ratio of over 200. We suspect he viewed
his cost of equity as being miniscule. If he was
using stock to ﬁnance an acquisition, a case could
be made that he was correct because overvalued
stock made acquisitions relatively inexpensive,
but investors expected exceedingly high returns
(reﬂected in a very high price to earnings ratio),
which necessarily means a high cost of equity.7
Even though the publicly traded ﬁrm’s cost of

5

for the possibility that family ﬁrms will seek to achieve a
variety of goals. Transgenerational value creation captures
multiple goals and a purpose that transcends proﬁtability,
better than wealth creation that really represents the means
rather than the ends of family enterprise or enterprising families . . . Put differently, noneconomic considerations will affect
both the unique resources and capabilities that lead to distinctive familiness and the pursuit of wealth-creating rents,
even in enterprising families, and should be actively incorporated into a theory of family ﬁrms” (2003, p. 468).
3
See Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002, pp. 420–436) for a traditional discussion of this concept.
4
Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002, p. 449) point out that estimating the cost of equity for privately owned ﬁrms is difﬁcult
because the ﬁrm’s stock is not publicly traded. Habbershon et
al. contend that the interaction of the family unit, the business
entity, and individual family members, in a family ﬁrm, create
an idiosyncratic pool of resources and capabilities and
“family-inﬂuenced ﬁrms may have unique potential for
trustf+-, cost of capitalf+-, . . . etc., depending upon the speciﬁc
context of the systemic inﬂuences of the family business
system” (2003, p. 460).
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McConaughy takes the position that “[g]reat family businesses are not content to receive nothing on their investments,”
which he views as counterintuitive to economic theory and
experience (1999, p. 357). He does argue that “a slight
modiﬁcation of the de Visscher,Aronoff, and Ward model eliminates the extreme solution where the cost of capital goes to 0
(zero) and yet retains the intuition of a family effect.”
6
In addition, several methods for determining the cost of
equity for a ﬁrm exist, including the CAPM, discounted cash
ﬂow (DCF), and bond-yield-plus risk premium approaches.
See Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002, pp. 424–436).
7
Brigham and Ehrhardt point out that “P/E ratios are higher
for ﬁrms with strong growth prospects, other things held constant” (2002, p. 87). If one uses either a constant growth or nonconstant growth model to estimate the price per share of a
ﬁrm’s stock, assuming the growth prospects of a ﬁrm increase,
then the price per share increases causing the P/E ratio, ceteris
paribus, to increase. Baker and Wurgler ﬁnd that “in practice,
equity market timing appears to be an important aspect of real
corporate ﬁnancial policy. There is evidence of market timing
in four different kinds of studies.” They go on to state that
“analyses of actual ﬁnancing decisions show that ﬁrms tend to
issue equity instead of debt when market value is high, relative
to book value and past market values, and tend to repurchase
equity when the market value is low” (2002, p. 1).

The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms

equity has a generally agreed-on theoretical
deﬁnition based on risk-adjusted industry and
market returns, it can still leave leaders wondering. Although it can be a bad idea, it is no wonder
that many still cling to the short-term (i.e., the
current) return on equity (ROE) as the cost of
equity. If an investment would lower the ROE—
don’t do it. Nice and simple. But, of this advice we
say caveat emptor, buyer beware, because the
short-term ROE is easy to manipulate!
The perplexing nature of the cost of equity
becomes magniﬁed, however, when business
leaders of private, not publicly traded companies
begin grappling with the issue. Although this
rarely interferes with their ability to manage the
enterprise, many leaders of private companies
request assistance in choosing a cost of capital
because of the uncertainty surrounding the cost of
equity. Luckily for them, most of their shareholders don’t understand these concepts either.

The Cost of Equity
We encourage private company leaders to recognize a simple fact: the cost of equity is generally
an expression of the expectations of investors.
Typically in the private company case, the leaders
and their family are the owners or equity
investors. So we propose that it is their own aspiration levels that yield their cost of equity. These
aspiration levels are captured in the goals for the
growth of the business and the ability of the business to fund their personal liquid wealth through
dividends and other withdrawals.
Thus, we think of two types of aspirations when
determining private company owners’ cost of
equity: desire for growth in proﬁts and desire for
income. High expectations for business growth

and dividends/withdrawals yields a very high cost
of equity that can put a business at risk and goes
against the frequently stated idea that a low cost
of equity is one of the competitive advantages of
a family business. On the other hand, more moderate expectations yield a more moderate cost of
equity.
Thus, we propose that a private company equate
its goals for growth and payout to its cost of
equity. This can be done by employing the following relation, which states that the long-term ROE
is the cost of equity.
CoE = ROE LT =

G target

(1 - Ptarget )

where
CoE = the cost of equity,
ROELT = the long-term target ROE,
Gtarget = the target for the annual growth rate in net
(after-tax) proﬁts of the business, and
Ptarget = the target for the annual proportion of net
proﬁt paid out/withdrawn from the business.
To illustrate this relationship, let us assume that
the leaders of a private business operate within an
industry that they believe can support a target
growth rate in net proﬁt of 20% annually over an
extended planning horizon. Further, the leaders
have a target annual withdrawal rate of 60% of net
proﬁts. The CoE relation would then be:
CoE =

G target

(1 - Ptarget )

=

0.2
= 50%.
(1 - 0.6)

A 20% annual growth rate in net proﬁts and a
60% pay-out ratio would constitute an extraordinarily high level of aspiration, one that would sink
many a business and be the stimulus for continuous and painful family ﬁghts. However, if these
289
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goals are potentially obtainable, the cost of equity
must be correspondingly high. Remember, as we
will illustrate later, this does not mean the ﬁrm
would necessarily have to make 50% returns
because equity is only one source of capital.
A ﬁrm’s growth target is strategically and emotionally important. Growth in proﬁt drives business decisions and wealth creation, but a target
must be grounded in reality. If the market in
which the ﬁrm competes has a growth forecast of
no more than 5% over the strategic horizon, then
a proﬁt-growth target of considerably more than
that is an unrealistic dream unless the business
makes considerable changes, such as entering new
markets or growing through acquisition.8
The emotional importance of a growth target is
very much tied to the psychology of goal-setting
and performance management. Given the role of
proﬁt growth in wealth creation, a target should be
aggressive. However, there are some nasty pitfalls
in an overly aggressive target. A major pitfall is
how leaders react to failure—particularly in their
evaluations of others. Unrealized high targets can
lead to harsh reactions that result in the best
employees leaving or signiﬁcant reductions in
morale and individual productivity. Another
pitfall is what we term the “growth ﬁrm paradox.”
An overly aggressive growth target yields a higher
cost of equity and (with the capital structure held
constant) cost of capital, which may cause leaders
to forego investments that fail to meet the high
hurdle rate. This failure to invest may thus cause
8

Acquisitions made by family ﬁrms are likely to be in the ﬁrm’s
core industry. For publicly traded ﬁrms in which founding
family ownership is still prevalent, Anderson and Reeb
(2003b), in the Journal of Law and Economics, ﬁnd that, among
S&P 500 ﬁrms, founding family ownership is associated with
signiﬁcantly less corporate diversiﬁcation relative to nonfamily ﬁrms.
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the ﬁrm to fail to achieve growth targets. A ﬁnal
pitfall is what we consider one of the great vulnerabilities of family business. In publicly traded
companies, share price goes down when people
who have high expectations believe the company
cannot meet those expectations. At that point, the
cost of equity goes down and, unfortunately,
so does the value of the business. In a private
company, when expectations are not being met,
the effect on the business is quite different and
may result in increasingly vocal and intrusive
shareholders at best, and litigation at worst.
Target setting for the payout of proﬁts is also
very strategic and potentially very emotional.
Most leaders have heard the investor’s conventional wisdom that “growth ﬁrms don’t pay dividends.” Although this is typically a public
company rule of thumb, it is no less true for the
nonpublic company.9 The setting of targets for
growth and payout is very interdependent. In our
earlier example, a growth target of 20% and a payout target of 60% yielded a very high 50% cost of
equity. And it should, since a ﬁrm must be enormously proﬁtable to simultaneously achieve both
goals over an extended period of time. And, of
course, the growth ﬁrm paradox may again be in
play.
This interdependence in goal setting can to
some extent be facilitated by ﬁrst recognizing that,
over the long run, a ﬁrm’s cost of equity is its ROE!
CoE = ROE LT .
Thus, a ﬁrm may set an ROE target, and then
employ this target to impose discipline on aspira9

Brigham and Ehrhardt state that “[s]hareholders prefer to
have the company retain earnings, hence pay less current dividends, if it has highly proﬁtable investment opportunities”
(2002, p. 391).

The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms

tions for growth and payout. (Recall that a
ﬁrm’s market is the principal disciplinarian.) So
the CoE equation introduced earlier may be used
to develop, shall we say, a growth/pay-out possibilities line. Such a set of lines are depicted in
Figure 1.
Each line in Figure 1 represents a combination
of proﬁt growth and pay-out rate that would yield
the indicated CoE/ROE. For example, let us look
speciﬁcally at the 25% line. If a ﬁrm targeted all
proﬁts to be retained and reinvested in the business (pay-out rate = 0), then an ROE of 25% would
be proﬁtable enough to sustain a 25% annual
growth rate in net proﬁt. But since it is hard to eat
a growth rate, owners may require some payout of
proﬁts. Thus, if the pay-out rate was targeted to be
20%, the ﬁrm’s 25% ROE would ﬁnance that
payout and still sustain a 20% annual growth rate
in proﬁt. If the leaders targeted a 50% payout, then

the 25% ROE could sustain a 12.5% annual growth
in proﬁt.
This interdependence of growth and pay-out
aspiration levels drives any business, but its ability
to facilitate goal setting in a private business is
highly signiﬁcant. Proﬁt growth and proﬁt payout
drive family wealth creation—and must be disciplined by levels of proﬁtability grounded in
reality. So, in summary, we propose that a ﬁrm’s
cost of equity is deﬁned by its long-term target
ROE. This ROE target is interdependently set via
the ﬁrm’s targets for growth and payout tempered
by its proﬁt potential.

The Cost of Capital
So far we have been looking only at owners’
money as the source of growth and payout.
However, when we add debt to the mix, some

25.00%
Earnings Growth Rate

25% ROE
20.00%

20% ROE
15.00%

15% ROE
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
0.00%

10% ROE
5% ROE

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%

80.00%

100.00%

Payout
Figure 1 Growth Pay-Out Possibilities.
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important things occur. For one, short-term
returns can drop and the business can still meet
aspirations for growth and payout so long as the
interest rate on debt is covered by these shortterm returns. In other words, we can ﬁnance our
aspirations with other people’s money—debt. This
is, of course, where the overall cost of capital
becomes important. And just as growth and payout targets are set based on leaders’ risk-taking
tendencies, so it is with debt. The deﬁnition of
“prudent” is very personal and very few decisionmakers look at the issuance of debt in quite the
same way.10
We do believe that the choice of debt level can
be determined a little more scientiﬁcally than
owners’ risk tolerances. We also believe that the
choice of debt is inﬂuenced dramatically by our
other aspirations as well. As we have demonstrated, our desire for a return on equity affects
our ability to pay out funds to owners, which
10

Evidence from publicly traded companies suggests “that
stock prices play an important role in determining a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing choice. Firms that experience large stock price
increases are more likely to issue equity and retire debt than
are ﬁrms that experience stock price declines. This observation is consistent with the idea that stock price increases are
generally associated with improved growth opportunities,
which would lower a ﬁrm’s optimal debt ratio” (Hovakimian,
Opler, & Titman, 2001, p. 22). Matthews,Vasudevan, Barton, and
Apana report that “Barton (1989) sought to identify from the
owner-manager’ experiences and perspectives the personal
and situational variables that inﬂuence private capital structure decisions . . . Open ended interviews were conducted with
CEO’s of privately held ﬁrms representing a variety of businesses . . . and the ﬁndings suggest that beliefs about and attitudes toward debt ﬁnancing can inﬂuence capital structure
decisions” (1994, pp. 353–354). The article also noted that
“based on the ﬁndings thus far it is posited that capital structure decisions in privately held ﬁrms are strongly determined
by the preferences, unique experiences, and characteristics of
the decision maker (in addition to ﬁrm characteristics such as
size, nature of business, availability of capital, as so on)” (1994,
p. 356). Anderson and Reeb (2003b), in the Journal of Law and
Economics, ﬁnd that for S&P 500 ﬁrms, “ ’family ﬁrms’ debt
levels do not signiﬁcantly differ from debt levels in non-family
ﬁrms.”
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affects our ability to grow, which, in turn, can
affect our ability to borrow funds. The simple
model in Figure 2 illustrates this.
To build a model that can explain how to balance
our numerous ﬁnancial aspirations and debt, our
enterprise must explicitly recognize two other
members who require payouts: the ﬁrst is the
lender, whose payout is represented by an interest
rate, and the second is the government, whose
payout is represented by an income-tax rate.
We now have all the elements necessary for
deﬁning the cost of capital. The cost of capital is a
weighted average encompassing the cost of equity
and the cost of debt. The weights are the proportion of assets ﬁnanced by equity and the
proportion of assets ﬁnanced by debt. We can
therefore introduce the model for the cost of
capital.
CoC = CoE ◊ (E target ) + CoD ◊ (D target ),
where
CoC = cost of capital,
CoE = cost of equity (as before),
CoD = cost of debt,
Dtarget = the desired proportion of assets to be
ﬁnanced by debt (generally referred to as the debt
ratio), and
Etarget = the desired proportion of assets to be
ﬁnanced by equity, or in other words, Etarget = 1 Dtarget.
As we earlier deﬁned the cost of equity, we are left
with the deﬁnition of the cost of debt.
CoD = i ◊ (1 - t)
where
i = the projected interest rate on debt, and
t = the projected income tax rate.

The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms

ROE

Payout

Debt

Growth

Figure 2 Interdependent Goals and Debt.

The cost of debt is the interest rate multiplied by
1 minus the tax rate because we do not pay taxes
on interest, which means the government subsidizes the assumption of debt.11 Putting all these
components together, the cost of capital can be
deﬁned as:
Ê G target ˆ
CoC = Á
˜ ◊ (1 - D target ) + i ◊ (1 - t) ◊ D target .
Ë (1 - Ptarget ) ¯
It is exceedingly important for leaders to grasp the
notion that each component of the cost of capital
is an expectation or aspiration, and that these
components should represent a highly interdependent goal-setting process where all goals need
to be compromised to make an attainable package
of goals. These interdependencies can be observed
in Table 1. One can track the impact of growth and
pay-out targets (as before), but also the willing-

ness (or lack thereof) to carry debt. In reviewing
the numbers in Table 1, keep in mind that the
interest rate is being held constant for varying
levels of debt. That would generally not be the case
as interest rates tend to increase with the level
of debt, but the rate is held constant here for
illustration.
As our targets for growth and/or payout
increase, so too does our cost of capital (on any
row of Table 1, this is driven entirely by the cost of
equity).12 And, most importantly, we now have a
gauge to assess the required proﬁtability of any
investment. For example, if we desire to grow
proﬁts at 20% per year while paying out 40% of
those proﬁts each year, we would require at least
a 26.0% rate of return on any investment if we
were only willing to ﬁnance assets with 25% debt.
12

11

This, of course, is only true for those countries that allow
interest as a tax-deductible expense.

One could argue in certain circumstances that a ﬁrm, particularly one with low business risk, that chooses a capital
structure containing zero debt views its cost of equity as being
lower than its cost of debt (after tax).
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Table 1 Cost of Capital Calculation
Target growth rate
Target pay-out rate
Target debt ratio
25%
50%
75%
ROE
Interest rate
Tax rate

10%
40%
60%
Cost of Capital
13.5%
19.7%
10.3%
14.5%
7.1%
9.2%
15.2%
22.7%
6%
35%

20%
40%

60%

26.0%
18.6%
11.3%
27.8%

38.5%
27.0%
15.4%
41.7%

If, on the other hand, the owners require or expect
a 60% payout, then our required rate of return
on any investment would rise to 38.5%. This, of
course, makes perfect sense—higher aspirations
cost money, and that money must generate a high
return. However, if we are willing to ﬁnance our
aspirations by increasing debt, our required
return drops accordingly. Thus, if our target debt
ratio were set at 50%, our 20% growth with a 60%
pay-out scenario could be ﬁnanced with investments requiring a 27.0% rate of return.
While we have observed that the market the
ﬁrm serves represents the ultimate disciplinarian,
the deployment of a cost of capital that is fundamentally tied to the ﬁrm’s goals for payout,
growth, and debt serves as an excellent source of
internal decision-making discipline.

that money by operating the business so as to
achieve a competitive position in the marketplace.
For the purposes of this article and for simplicity’s
sake we propose that the most valid and reliable
measure of operating a business effectively is
deﬁned by the operating proﬁt a business generates based on the asset base required to support
that level of activity. (Irrespective of how those
assets were ﬁnanced, meaning what combination
of debt and equity.) Although this measure was
historically termed the return on assets, it has
more recently been given the title of basic earning
power (BEP). This is a view of the return on assets
that we enthusiastically endorse. It is basic, it represents the power to really generate growth and
payout, and it is based on operating earnings. BEP
can be represented as:

The Profit Engine

BEP =

We now introduce the most pragmatic of realizations—ultimately, the business has to be managed
so that it can stay alive and the most common way
to ensure survival is to make money.13 We make
13
In rare cases, family owners view the CoE as negative; the
business can be so meaningful to a family and provide nonmonetary returns of such psychological or other value that the
family is willing to fund continued losses. Such a business and
family are unsustainable over the long run unless other sources
of income and wealth creation are available.
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operating income EBIT
=
,
assets
assets

where
EBIT = earnings (end of year) before interest and
taxes, and
Assets = beginning-of-year total assets.
Obviously, when we generate more BEP, everything gets “easier”—growth, payout, and debt
requirements. We can begin to examine this fact

The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms

by ﬁrst deﬁning ROE in a traditional manner (i.e.,
the short-term ROE).
ROE =

net profit Ê equity defined as ˆ
Á
˜.
equity Ë beginning -of - year¯

Using simple algebra, we can then work this more
traditional deﬁnition into a BEP-driven relation.
ROE =

(earnings before tax) ◊ (1 - t)

assets - debt
(assets and debt also beginning -of - year)

ROE =

ROE =

[(EBIT - i ◊ debt) ◊ (1 - t)] assets
[assets - debt] assets
(BEP - i ◊ D) ◊ (1 - t)
1- D

Note that we are now deﬁning ROE strictly in
terms of ratios (BEP, i, D, t). Further, since we have
deﬁned the long-run ROE as
ROE =

G
1-P

and since ROE must equal ROE, we can say that

(BEP - i ◊ D) ◊ (1 - t)
G
=
.
1-P
1- D
So we are now in a position to specify the level of
basic proﬁtability (BEP) to run our growth and
level of payout given our willingness to accept risk

(debt). How we achieve that BEP is, of course, what
strategic and operational excellence is all about.
Here, we are focusing on goal setting and its implications for the cost of capital. For a given goal
package (targets), the level of basic proﬁtability
needed to sustain our interdependent goals is
given by:
Ê G target ˆ Ê 1 - D target ˆ
BEPtarget = Á
˜ ◊Á
˜ + i ◊ D target .
Ë 1 - Ptarget ¯ Ë 1 - t ¯
This relation is illustrated in Table 2. The
interpretation of the data in Table 2 is essentially identical to Table 1, except that now we are
looking at BEP requirements versus the cost of
capital.
When an owning family gets speciﬁc (as it
should) regarding its aspiration levels for growth
and payout and its willingness to assume debt,
then for assumed rates of interest and income tax,
there is one and only one minimum level of basic
proﬁtability (BEP) that will sustain all of this over
time. Yes, we now know the deﬁnition of real
money.
When we independently (vs. interdependently)
set our executive-level goals, we are almost always,
by deﬁnition, going to make a mistake. And
someone’s accountabilities—and career—may be
highly impacted by that mistake. We recently

Table 2 Target Basic Earning Power
Target growth rate
Target pay-out rate
Target debt ratio
25%
50%
75%
ROE
Interest rate
Tax rate

10%
40%
Target BEP
20.7%
15.8%
10.9%
16.7%
6%
35%

60%

20%
40%

60%

30.3%
22.2%
14.1%
25.0%

40.0%
28.6%
17.3%
33.3%

59.2%
41.5%
23.7%
50.0%
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observed a $30 billion corporation publish its
ﬁnancial goals for all employees and stockholders
to see. Those goals included proﬁt growth and
BEP. Even given the extremely low interest rates of
the time, this corporation’s historical debt and
pay-out ratios were such that there was no way
the target (or current) BEP could come close to
funding its growth target.
To the extent that our goals are not mutually
attainable, something is going to have to give.And,
thus, someone or something is going to have to
change or mistakes and failures will be made. We
may have to take on more risk or lower our payout and/or growth targets. We may have to
signiﬁcantly alter certain behaviors that could be
holding down BEP. But something must give. It
should be obvious by this stage that it is best to
have a framework to judge mutual attainability
and impose discipline on this highly important
process.
Since mutual goal attainment implies getting
our employees involved in helping us get there, we
have an important recommendation for information sharing and organizational goal setting. We
encourage leaders of private ﬁrms to hold themselves accountable for ROE targets and deploy BEP
as the principal metric of performance-based
communication for the organization. Nonexecutive members of businesses are helping to manage
operations, not capital structure. They are actively
making production and scheduling decisions,
cost-management decisions, maintenance decisions, helping to select continuous improvement
projects, perhaps setting inventory targets, and so
forth. People can readily identify with BEP and its
connectivity to their jobs and this knowledge is of
immeasurable importance in assisting them to
succeed in their work.
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As a matter of fact, we can even use BEP as the
primary cost of capital metric. Note that, again
using simple algebra, the BEP relation can be
easily restated:
Ê G target ˆ Ê 1 - D target ˆ
BEPtarget = Á
˜ ◊Á
˜ + i ◊ D target .
Ë 1 - Ptarget ¯ Ë 1 - t ¯
Ê G target ˆ
BEPtarget ◊ (1 - t) = Á
˜ ◊ (1 - D target ) + i ◊ (1 - t)
Ë 1 - Ptarget ¯
◊ D target
BEPtarget ◊ (1 - t) = CoE ◊ (E target ) + CoD ◊ (D target )
BEPtarget ◊ (1 - t) = CoC
Thus, the tax-adjusted target BEP for the ﬁrm (not
the actual, current BEP!) is the ﬁrm’s cost of
capital. This is a marvelous managerial result for
driving all operational metrics—including those
for capital spending—through the primary operational metric: basic earning power.
In summary, all wealth creation must ultimately
be funded by operational excellence. A ﬁrm’s cost
of capital is simply a direct measure of operational
excellence requirements, which then fund growth
and payout, and mitigate risk.

Employing Cost of Capital for
Managerial and Institutional
Decision Making
Goal setting is an important job, yet we would be
remiss if we did not also address how the cost-ofcapital approach affects managerial and institutional decision making. At the managerial level, we
are concerned with more accurately aligning managerial incentives and performance measures with
shareholder aspirations. We discuss below one
approach to achieve goal and incentive alignment:
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Economic Value Added or EVA®.14 At the institutional level, we are concerned with determining
appropriate levels of debt (debt that is not too
risky) and when it is appropriate to depart from
the cost of capital approach for making decisions.

EVA®
We have shown how an understanding of BEP at
an operational level can help managers determine
how to best meet performance demands that meet
the owners’ stated cost of capital. There is one
important improvement that can be offered for
companies willing to embrace further sophistication. Although businesses are too often managed
via “the idea of the year,” the framework of Economic Value Added (EVA®) has enormous merit
for managerial decision making.
Back in the mid 1900s, the notion of “residual
income” gained a foothold in management.15 In
our current notation and vocabulary, the concept
of residual income held that a ﬁrm must earn its
target BEP on its asset base in order to have
earned a true economic proﬁt. Thus,
RI = EBITA - BEPtarget ◊ Assets
where
RI = residual income,
EBITA = actual operating income for the year,

14

Stern Stewart & Co.’s version of residual income (Stewart,
1991).“EVA® represents the residual income that remains after
the cost of all capital, including equity capital, has been
deducted” (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2002, p. 50).
15
“The concept (of residual income) appeared as early as the
1920’s (e.g. in Dupont’s bonus plan calculation of its ‘Executive
Trust Fund’), and has been frequently discussed in management accounting texts since General Electric adopted it in the
1950’s” (Christensen, Feltham, & Wu, 2002, p. 2). Gebhardt, Lee,
and Swaminathan (2001) use a discounted residual income
model, a version of the discounted cash ﬂow model, to generate a market implied cost of capital that they assert can be used
to estimate the cost of capital for nontraded ﬁrms.

BEPtarget = the target basic earning power, and
Assets = the beginning-of-year asset base.
Obviously, if a ﬁrm’s actual BEP exceeds its target
BEP then it will have a positive residual income.
But the conversion to dollars from ratios has
certain beneﬁts if we are not comparing across
businesses—particularly in the creation of such
incentives as “bonus pools.” The rationale is that
if we are achieving target BEP, then current operations are funding our target growth, pay-out, and
debt levels. Thus, there is a “residual” that may be
disbursed, at least in part, as an incentive.
Economic Value Added (EVA®) is a form of
residual income. It has the following deﬁnition:
EVA = EBITA ◊ (1 - t) - CoC ◊ Assets.
So we are essentially substituting net operating
proﬁt after tax (NOPAT) for operating proﬁt and
the cost of capital for the target BEP. Note that:
EVA
= BEPA ◊ (1 - t) - BEPtarget ◊ (1 - t).
Assets
Therefore, the EVA® metric and the residual
income metric are very similar: both RI and EVA®
are zero when the actual BEP is equal to the target
BEP.
The architects of EVA® take this framework into
some operationally signiﬁcant directions. For
instance, in order to account for value as it is used,
they are passionate about capitalizing many items
that the accounting profession would normally
expense (R&D, many marketing expenses, many
development expenses, etc.); they advocate unique
methodologies for depreciating assets based on
“use”; and (for public companies) they advocate
the use of market valuations for weighting factors
in the cost of capital (as do many in the ﬁnancial
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community, but we are addressing private companies here).16 However, the point to be emphasized

All of us are aware of paragons of strategic
excellence who essentially carry no debt.18 No

is that the cost-of-capital framework presented
here is very compatible with such contemporary
concepts as EVA®. The chief beneﬁt of an EVA®
approach is that it aligns managerial incentives
with shareholder aspirations by not penalizing
managers for long-term decisions. In EVA®, investment decisions (including those for people, marketing, and product development) are accounted
for in a manner that does not reduce short-term
proﬁtability. (Note that EVA® calculations are
made for assessing managerial and ﬁrm performance, and not for calculating corporate taxes.)

matter how eloquent the leaders of those companies may be in the defense of their debt policy,
zero debt makes very little sense. But when does a
willingness to assume ﬁnancial risk move from
smart to too risky?
Let us come at this question from another direction: Can you raise your debt ratio simply to raise
your pay-out ratio? Absolutely, although that is not
how we would recommend explaining things to
one’s banker. If a ﬁrm’s BEP is signiﬁcantly higher
than its cost of debt, raise the debt level and raise
the payout! This of course raises the cost of equity
but could actually lower the cost of capital.
Yet we still must come to grips with risk-taking
tendencies and provide a measure of risk that
does not make things too complicated. We have
generally found that business leaders quickly
identify with “interest coverage” as an appropriate
criterion for expressing their willingness to take
on debt. The deﬁnition of interest coverage is:

Managing Financial Risk (Debt)
We have carefully noted how the interdependent
goals for payout, growth, and debt have both
strategic and emotional components—invariably
leading to signiﬁcant differences in perception
among shareholders or an executive team. The
pay-out target can be quite emotional, especially
as it interacts with the growth target. We have also
observed that individual differences in risk
tolerance—as measured by the willingness to
assume debt—can be enormous.17

16

Rogerson demonstrates the importance of setting the depreciation rule “so that the total cost allocated to each period is
proportional to the relative productivity of the asset in each
period. This rule can therefore be viewed as being consistent
with a version of the ‘matching principle’ from accounting,
which states that costs should be allocated across objectives in
proportion to the beneﬁts that the costs create across objectives” (1997, p. 773).
17
Leland points out that “[e]quityholders control the ﬁrm’s
choice of capital structure and investment risk. In maximizing
the value of their claims, equityholders will choose strategies
that reduce the value of other claimants, including the government (tax collector), external claimants in default, and
debtholders. Modigliani and Miller (1963) emphasize the
importance of taxes and default costs in determining leverage.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize the importance of
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C = interest coverage =

EBIT
BEP
=
.
interest payments i ◊ D

This measure of risk, which is fairly easy to work
with, generally is excellent to use as a “policy”
target. Interest coverage is simply the number of
times operating income “covers” the ﬁrm’s annual
interest payments. Interest coverage of only two
times is highly risky (operating income in this

bondholders’ claims in determining risk. But all claimants
must be jointly recognized in the determination of capital
structure and investment risk” (1998, p. 1237).
18
In a privately held ﬁrm, when the cost of equity is less than
the cost of debt (tax effected), because of owners’ aspirations,
then no debt makes sense because its use increases the cost of
capital and risk. This concept is related to the one expressed in
footnote 11.
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case is only twice the ﬁrm’s annual interest
payment). Any negative disturbances in the ﬁrm’s
marketplace or in its competitive position could
have dire consequences. Alternatively, an interest
coverage of, say, 10 times translates into being
fairly risk averse. We must note that excess cash
(cash on hand that is greater than needed for
working capital) further reduces risk and quite
often can make smaller interest coverage ratios
not very risky at all.19
Certainly, the stability or instability of the marketplace in which the ﬁrm competes must be a
factor behind the choice of an interest-coverage
target—not just the leaders’ predispositions. For
example, prior to deregulation, public utilities in
the United States could carry huge debt ratios
(and large payouts) since their low interest coverage did not really represent that much risk. Things
have changed.
If we substitute interest coverage (C) for the
debt ratio (D) in our basic model. we arrive at the
following equation:
ROE target =
=

G target
1 - Ptarget

=

(BEPtarget - i ◊ D target ) ◊ (1 - t)
1 - D target

some combination of growth and payout. Further,
we make the interest rate a nonlinear function of
the debt ratio, rising rapidly at high levels of the
debt ratio. We hold the tax rate constant. We can
then see the impact on the ﬁrm’s target BEP, target
debt ratio, interest rate, and cost of capital. If the
ﬁrm’s leaders are willing to tolerate an interest
coverage of two times, the ﬁrm would require a
22% BEP, would maintain a target debt ratio of
72%, have a cost of capital of 14%, but would be
carrying an interest rate of 15%.20 On the other
hand, if the leaders require an interest coverage of
10 times, the ﬁrm would have to seek a target BEP
of 27%, would maintain a target debt ratio of 38%,
have a cost of capital of 17%, and would be carrying only a 7% interest rate. And if coverage was
required to be “inﬁnity” (no debt), the target BEP
would rise to 39%, and the cost of capital becomes
the cost of equity (25%). (These results are directionally very sound, but are of course impacted by
the assumed behavior of interest rates.)
Risk aversion is costly. Risk embracing can
become costly. The choice of coverage is still personal, tempered by the variability of the market-

BEPtarget ◊ (1 - 1 C target ) ◊ (1 - t)
1 - BEP i ◊ C target

This relation may be observed in Figure 3. In this
ﬁgure, we assume that the ﬁrm has adopted an
ROE target (and cost of equity) of 25% based on

19
Excess cash has also been found to enhance corporate performance in certain circumstances. Mikkelson and Partch analyzed “89 publicly traded U.S. ﬁrms that held more than 25%
of their assets in cash and cash equivalents at the end of years
1986–1991” (2003, p. 276). They found that operating performance of high cash ﬁrms was comparable to or greater than
comparable low cash ﬁrms (size and industry). They report
that “high cash holdings are accompanied by greater investment, particularly R&D expenditures, and by greater growth in
assets” (2003, p. 275).

20

Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) ﬁnd that “founding family
ownership (in S&P 500 ﬁrms) reduces the cost of debt
ﬁnancing. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that family ﬁrms enjoy a 32 basis
point lower cost of debt ﬁnancing relative to non-family ﬁrms.”
This, of course, supports the idea that founding family ownership reduces agency conﬂicts between shareholders and bondholders. Anderson and Reeb (2003a), in The Journal of Finance,
ﬁnd that family ownership is prevalent in one-third of S&P
500 ﬁrms and accounts for 18% of the outstanding equity of
those ﬁrms. They also ﬁnd that family ﬁrms, relative to nonfamily ﬁrms, enjoy both a statistically signiﬁcantly higher ROA
and Tobin’s Q values. These results conﬁrm McConaughy,
Walker, Henderson, and Mishra’s (1998) ﬁndings. Anderson
and Reeb (2003b), in the Journal of Law and Economics, ﬁnd
no statistically signiﬁcant difference in family ﬁrms’ systematic risk or ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk relative to nonfamily ﬁrms. This
result, coupled with family ﬁrms’ lower cost of debt ﬁnancing,
supports the view that family ﬁrms generally have a lower cost
of capital than nonfamily ﬁrms.
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place. However, these frameworks bring some
order and rigor to the goal-setting process.

Prudent Departures From the
Cost-of-Capital Approach
The cost of capital is a theoretical construct. It is
primarily useful in the evaluation of business performance and investment alternatives. These
investment opportunities involve forecasts, estimates, and the assumption of operating risks.
Adding plant capacity versus going into a new
market does not represent the same accuracy of
forecasts or the same level of risk.
Most mature companies have a hierarchical categorization of capital investments that looks
something like the following.
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1. Regulatory/legal requirements.
2. Essential capital maintenance.
3. Competitive imperative.
4. Proﬁt-adding facilities and equipment.
5. Business expansion.
6. New product/market introduction.
A signiﬁcant proportion of a ﬁrm’s annual capital
budget could be accounted for by the ﬁrst three of
these categories. And these are not expected to
earn the cost of capital—or perhaps even generate a proﬁt. Thus, the other categories must
account for the proﬁtability needed to fund
growth and pay-out aspirations. Typically, only
proﬁt-adding equipment is evaluated by simply
meeting the exact cost of capital. Business expansion and product/market introduction capital are
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required to show a signiﬁcant premium to the cost
of capital, not just because they must take up slack
but also because they have a signiﬁcantly higher
level of risk.
The category of “competitive imperative” is
chosen by managers to justify everything from
corporate jets to product development following a
competitor’s preemption. Huge information technology investments are often undertaken without
having to meet any cost-of-capital hurdle. The category “competitive imperative” is absolutely
required to meet the realities of the real world—
and meeting these realities is often quite imperative. One key real-world imperative is retaining
key personnel who may be the source of a capital
proposal!21
One of the serious problems with allowing
capital projects to be classiﬁed as a competitive
imperative is that people hide behind it. This
relieves them of doing the necessary analysis to
really demonstrate that the project has worth. One
way ﬁrms deal with this is to require a full capital
justiﬁcation of all competitive imperative projects,
including the calculation of a rate of return. The
ﬁrm may then apply discount factors to the cost
of capital as it would apply premium factors to
business expansion and product/market introduction projects.
The concept of “discount factors” or “premium
factors” may be a reasonable metric for leaders to

consider when evaluating investment alternatives,
evaluating people, and evaluating their own motivations, meaning, for a given decision, what “discount” from the cost of capital one is willing to
accept in order to accept the investment, or keep
the individual, just because! The answers to these
questions are of course very personal, but the
methodology presented here allows one to clearly
understand what departures from cost-of-capital
targets are costing the organization in terms of
achieving ﬁnancial goals.

Summary
Adding rigor and discipline to the goal-setting
and decision-making process is greatly facilitated
by deploying cost-of-capital concepts. Further, a
ﬁrm need not be a public corporation in order to
apply these techniques. A private ﬁrm can attach
its cost of equity capital to its level of aspiration
as reﬂected by (1) its goals for growth and payout,
(2) its tolerance of debt, and (3) its need for basic
earning power. The frameworks and techniques
are not abstractions; they represent sound application of basic ﬁnancial discipline. Finally, these
frameworks and techniques force us to understand how interdependent an organization’s
ﬁnancial goals are and how that interdependence
permeates all ﬁnancial decision making.
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